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Incentivising universal safe delivery in Nepal: ten years of experience  
Abstract 
Background: Payments to users and providers of health services are an important ingredient in 
attempts to promote universal health coverage in low resource settings. The maternal health 
programme in Nepal explicitly recognises that ensuring universal access to safe delivery care requires 
policies that both ensure effective services and overcome demand-side barriers. The programme has 
used three innovative financing initiatives to stimulate an increase in the use of facility based delivery:  
the maternity incentive scheme (2005) reimbursing women for accessing a facility, activity payments 
in poor districts (2006) and universal free-delivery (2009).  We examine the impact of these 
mechanisms on access to safe delivery services.  
Methods: Multiple waves of the Demographic and Health Survey were merged to provide household-
level cross-sectional data on maternity services. A multilevel logit model was used to investigate the 
roll-out of the three policies across ecological zones assuming a district-wide treatment effect. An 
interrupted time-series approach that includes cross sectional data on deliveries at each period is used 
to detect the association between outcomes and policy.  
Findings:  The maternal Incentive programme was associated with an increase in service delivery in 
hill and tarai areas. A positive effect in mountain areas was detectable as a result of the supply-side 
payments made to facilities for delivery. While use among the non-poor increased across the country, 
a positive effect on the poorest population is was only present in mountain areas.   
Conclusion: The beneficial impact of maternal financing policies in Nepal is skewed towards areas and 
households that are geographically more accessible and wealthy. Inferior services in remote areas 
reduce the impact of financing policies. Policy may need to be refocused on poorer, less accessible 
areas if improvements in access to maternal health services are to continue.  
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Introduction 
Direct payments to users, through demand-side financing, and providers, performance based supply-
side payments, through of health services forms an important ingredient of attempts to increase the 
uptake of health services and promote universal health coverage in low resource settings. Payments 
have had some success in incentivising service delivery although evidence on their cost-effectiveness 
is mixed (Murray et al., 2014, Witter et al., 2012).   
Against a background of low use of services and high maternal mortality, the Nepalese Government 
has sought to incentivise maternal health services.  The mechanisms introduced with strong political 
backing focus on stimulating the uptake of institutional delivery services. They combine a conditional 
cash transfer (demand-side payments) for all women that deliver in a facility with performance-based 
supply-side payments to create additional capacity to deliver quality services.  We make use of four 
rounds of the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) to review their impact ten years on.  
The article is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the evolution of the scheme and 
published evidence on impact. The third and fourth sections describe the methods used and present 
findings. The final section discusses the implications of the findings for the future of the scheme.  
Incentivising safe deliveries  
From the late 1990s, the Nepal maternal health programme invested heavily in improving birthing 
facilities in the most disadvantaged areas through improvements in physical infrastructure, 
particularly birthing centres, training of nurse-midwives as anaesthetic assistants and strengthening 
blood banking (Rath et al., 2007). It was estimated that by 2004, met-need for care had reached 14% 
across the country (an increase from less than 5% in the mid-1990s). Differences in provision still 
persisted. The programme struggled to ensure that comprehensive obstetric care providing surgical 
and instrumental interventions, was provided across the country:  according to the HMIS, in 2003 
there were 2.5 hospital beds per 10,000 population in tarai and 1.27 in hills but only 0.98 in mountain 
areas (Ministry of Health and Population, 2004). Similarly, studies demonstrated huge differences in 
access to facilities. One survey found that women took on average 2.8 hours to reach a birthing facility 
in the tarai, 5.6 hours in hills and 8.3 hours in mountain areas (Borghi et al., 2006). Stimulating demand 
for services was also seen as a vital part of the strategy and some mechanisms, including loan schemes, 
were initiated. It was recognised, however, that further work to increase care seeking was key the 
overall success of the programme (Rath et al., 2007).  
 
The maternity incentive scheme (MIS) was introduced from July 2005 following a study that suggested 
that costs associated with delivery were discouraging women from having a facility-based birth; 
reaching a facility accounted for around two-thirds of these costs (Borghi et al., 2006). A policy was 
quickly formulated and implemented  with strong commitment from a government that was eager to 
use the policy to appeal to voters (Ensor et al., 2008). From July 2005, an incentive was introduced to 
be paid to all women delivering at public facilities. The payment to women was graduated:  NPR 1,500   
in mountain; NPR 1,000 in hill; and NPR 500 in tarai areas to reflect the higher costs in remoter areas 
(Family Health Division, 2005). Payment was designed to defray part of their costs but not fully 
compensate women for all expenditures incurred. .  
From July 2006 the scheme, renamed the Safe delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP), facilities in the 
25 districts with lowest human development (based on a district Human Development Index) were 
paid a flat fee of NPR 1,000 per delivery regardless of complexity or length of stay. All mountain and 
some of the hill districts were included.  Health workers in these districts also received an incentive 
payment of NPR 300 for carrying out deliveries in facilities and ŝŶĂǁŽŵĞŶ ?s own home. The latter 
recognised that home deliveries were likely to continue for some time and that a priority was to make 
them safer. The payment was reduced to NPR 200  in  January 2009 and NPR 100 in July 2012 amidst 
evidence of persistent but low level fraudulent claims  (Family Health Division, 2005, Family Health 
Division, 2007, Family Health Division, 2009) . At first benefits were limited to women having two or 
fewer    ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶƚŽŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌǀĞƌƐĞŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŽŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ; this requirement was later 
dropped (Family Health Division, 2007, Ministry of Health and Population Nepal et al., 2014). The 
scheme was broadened beyond the public sector to include community and teaching hospitals (2006), 
accredited NGO facilities and some for-profit private facilities (2009).  
In January 2009, the Aama programme was implemented which made delivery care free across the 
country (Family Health Division, 2009). Aama set a fixed reimbursement for various categories of 
delivery and complication differentiated by size of facility. Non-government facilities receiving 
accreditation from the Ministry of Health and Population receive the same level of reimbursement 
(Ensor and Witter, 2008).  Since government facilities receive the Aama reimbursement in addition to 
their usual budget while it is the only source of funding for deliveries in non-government facilities it 
has been argued that the scheme is biased against non-government provision (Suresh Tiwari et al., 
2015). Aama was merged in 2012 with an existing but less successful incentive scheme for four 
antenatal care visits to capitalise on the high visibility of Aama and reduce the number of parallel 
schemes  (Subedi et al., 2015, Adhikari et al., 2011).  
A number of studies have looked at the impact of the MIS and SDIP schemes. Early evidence suggested 
that their implementation was slow with much variation across districts due to ignorance of schemes 
and delays with central level fund release (Powell-Jackson et al., 2009). There were also differences in 
local practice particularly around eligibility for incentives. Recent evidence suggests  that knowledge 
of the scheme has increased substantially over time but with less impact in  hard to reach areas (Bhusal 
et al., 2011). A quasi-experimental study that allocated women to matched treatment and control 
groups according to whether they knew about the scheme found that over the first three years the 
scheme was associated with a 4.2 percentage point increase in delivery with a skilled attendant  
(Powell-Jackson and Hanson, 2012). The non-poor appear to have benefited disproportionately 
reflecting the lack of physical accessibility to  public  services by poorer populations (Tim Powell-
Jackson and Rebecca Wolfe, 2008). 
The Aama scheme learned from teething problems with previous programmes and has  generally 
functioned effectively although bottlenecks are reported in provision of services due to lack of key 
staff and dwindling general revenues that perpetuate patient payments (Witter et al., 2011). Providers 
suggest that Aama funding ensured the general functioning of facilities enabling all services to 
continue to function. The 2012 Household Survey  reports that almost 70% of household heads were 
aware of the Aama Programme but there is variation by ethnicity, terrain and income (Ministry of 
Health and Population, 2013).   Multivariate analysis of 750 deliveries from the household survey 
found that introduction of the Aama programme was associated with a 4.6 percentage point increase 
in the use of government maternity services (Powell-Jackson et al., 2010).  
  
Methods 
We merged three rounds (2001, 2006 and 2011) of the NDHS to investigate the impact of the 
mechanisms. The programmes were rolled out in different ways across the country and we use this 
variation to investigate their differential impact. An interrupted time series approach that takes 
account of the monthly nature of births reported in the NDHS and adjusts for variation in 
characteristics at the individual level was used.  The multivariate analysis was undertaken on NDHS 
data for the period 1999 to 2011, providing an analysis six years prior to the first policy (MIS) and six 
years afterwards. The model allows for two separate effects of each policy. First an immediate effect 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŝŶƚĞƌĐĞƉƚĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚĂŐƌĂĚƵĂů ‘ďƵŝůĚ-ƵƉ ? effect through a change in the slope on 
the time variable. This formulation explicitly recognises that policy impact can be gradual and that its 
effect may not be fully felt for many months or years.  
We focus on how three main outcome variables - facility based deliveries, delivery with a skilled health 
worker and by caesarean section - vary in response to the policies (Table 1). Skilled workers include 
doctors, midwives and nurses but not workers that have SBA training but no formal medical 
qualification.      
<Table 1 about here> 
 
The models separates  the sample according to the groups in table one to examine the impact of each 
policy combination compared with base outcome levels that vary across ecological zones and adjusted 
for individual and household covariates as follows: 
௜ܱ௝௠ ൌ ߶଴ ൅ ߶ଵܪ ൅ ߶ଶܯ ൅ ߶ଷ ௠ܶ ൅ ߶ସܪ௠ ൅ ߶ହܯ௠ ൅ ߶଺ܶଵ ൅ ߶଻ܪଵ  ൅  ߶଼ܯଵ ൅ ߶ଽܶ ݉? ൅ ߶ଵ଴ܪ ݉? ൅߶ଵଵܯ ݉? ൅߶ଵଶܪ ? ൅ ߶ଵଷܯ ? ൅ ߶ଵସܪ ݉? ൅ ߶ଵହܯ ݉? ൅ ߶ଵ଺ܶ ? ൅ ߶ଵ଻ܪ ? ൅ ߶ଵ଼ܶ ݉? ൅ ߶ଵଽܪ ݉? ൅ ׎ ௜ܺ௝௠ ൅ ௝݁ ൅ ݒ௠ ൅ ݑ௜௝௠                           (1) 
Where Oijm are the study outcomes for individual i in cluster j at month m; H and M are dummy 
variables for hill and mountain areas (tarai is the reference category), Tm, Hm, Mm  are underlying trend 
outcomes in each ecological zone; the immediate effect of the introduction of the MIS is captured by 
intercept variables (ܶଵ ǡ ܪଵ ǡ ܯଵ ) while the gradual build-up effect are captured by trend slope-dummy 
variables ( ௠ܶଵ ǡ ܪ௠ଵ ǡ ܯ௠ଵ )  for periods after July 2005; similarly the effect of the SDIP intervention is 
captured by intercept (ܪଶ ǡ ܯଶ ) and trend variables (ܪ௠ଶ ǡ ܯ௠ଶ )  for periods after July 2006 and the 
effect of Aama is captured by intercept (ܶଷ ǡ ܪଷ )  and trend variables ( ௠ܶଷ ǡ ܪ௠ଷ )   for periods after 
January 2009; Xijm is vector of covariates including asset index quintiles, parity, maternal and paternal 
education, whether location of birth was rural or urban and religion. The roll-out of the programme 
was fragmented and uneven. This suggests that that potentially non-linear roll-out of the programme 
suggests that outcomes may follow non-linear trends. To incorporate the possibility of this non-
linearity we include polynomial of degree two through five trend terms and compare with the base 
model using a log-likelihood test.   
District specific random effects are ( ௝݁) are included to take account of area variation, a  time specific 
random effect term (zt)  to account of correlation across time period specific variation and a 
households random effect term (ݒ௠) to allow for common variation between households since some 
report more than one birth over the period and an individual random error (ݑ௜௝௠). The structure of the 
DHS, means that some births reported can occur up to five years after the actual delivery. Although 
an important and memorable event, it is possible that this delay could lead to a bias in reported 
outcome. We adjust this by incorporating a recall variable define as time period between interview 
and birth date into the model.  
Marginal effects are calculated to assess the impact on the probability of each outcome at time of 
intervention in each zone and mean values of other covariates. They are computed for each 
intervention separately compared to a counterfactual of no intervention at the same point in time. 
For later interventions the counterfactual assumes the earlier, zone-specific, interventions have been 
applied.  The overall effect, indicates the impact of all interventions combined in each zone compared 
to a counterfactual at the time of Aama introduction.  
A necessary although not sufficient condition for a plausible causal relationship between policy and 
outcome in both models is that the breakpoint should occur after policy implementation. We 
independently test for an unknown structural breakpoint in the coefficients.  This is undertaken using 
a series of likelihood ratio tests to identify the maximum value of the wald test statistic and 
implemented using the stata function estat sbsingle for a time-series in each zone separately.  
Results 
Descriptive statistics suggest that average outcome indicators have generally for each of the ecological 
zones improved over each of the main policy periods (Table 2). The improvement is most notable in 
the tarai and hill areas with higher human development.  Caesarean section rates remain low by 
international standards across all periods although there is a noticeable increase in tarai areas.  
<Table 2 about here> 
Trends across the periods, suggest that the impact of policy builds up over time following policy 
implementation. Facility delivery in both tarai and hill areas is associate with a gradual increase 
following the start of the MIS (figure one) while there is no perceptible change in mountain areas until 
after the start of the SDIP. Modest increases in use of services between 2003 and 2005 may be 
attributed to earlier improvements on the supply side under the safer motherhood programme.  
<figure 1 about here> 
The multivariate analysis indicates that the starting value for facility delivery and sba outcomes were 
significantly lower in mountain compared to  hill and tarai, while the secular increase in outcomes 
was significant in tarai (p<0.01) but not in other zones (Table 3).   
Policies are associated with significant changes in maternal outcomes after taking account of general 
differences in in each zone, secular trends and individual covariates.  For the MIS, there are significant 
time effects both for the tarai and hill areas for facility delivery and delivery with a skilled health 
worker. The SDIP was associated with a large (greater than 10 percentage points (pp)) and significant 
(p<0.01) effect on both facility delivery and with a skilled worker in mountain but not in hill areas.  The 
Aama policy was associated with no statistically significant effect in any zone.   
Marginal effects examine the total percentage point impact of each policy combining the initial change 
in intercept with the policy-trend. Marginal effects are calculated 2 years after the initial introduction 
of the policy compared with a counterfactual of no policy only secular time-trend. For the MIS, a 
positive increase in facility delivery of 7 pp for facility delivery and between 5.2 and 10.2 pp for delivery 
with a skilled worker was found for hill and tarai areas. By contrast, the MIS is associated with a 
reduction in both outcomes in mountain areas. For the SDIP, large changes are recorded in mountain 
areas for all outcomes (p<0.001). No significant marginal effects are recorded for the Aama policy. A 
25 pp effect for the effect of all policies combined was found in the tarai zone (p<0.001) and around 
13 pp in hill (p<0.1) and mountain (p<0.001) zones. The policies appear to have had little or no effect 
on the rate of caesarean section. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
Different effects of policy for the poor and non-poor are suggested by the  marginal effects on facility 
delivery (Table 4). Outcomes for the non-poor in tarai and hill and improved largely as a result of the 
introduction of the MIS; the effects are large (around 30 pp), positive and significant (positive but not 
significant in mountain areas).  For the poor, the main association was the SDIP policy in mountain 
areas which demonstrate a significant positive effect that underpins the overall cumulative positive 
effect on utilisation. For the poor in hill areas, the overall impact of the programme is slightly negative 
although the effects are not statistically significant.  
<Table 4 about here> 
 
The independent test for an unknown structural break in the data broadly supports the finding of 
structural breaks after policy implementation but at different times for each ecological zone. The 
test for tarai found the most likely break in April 2006 (wald=334, p<0.0001) and for hill areas in 
November 2006 (wald, p<0.0001), respectively 9 and 16 months after the introduction of the MIS. 
The most likely break in mountain areas was in December 2007 (wald 50.3, p<0.0001), 29 months 
after MIS and 17 months after SDIP implementation.  The recall variable was found not to be 
significant (facility delivery p=0.87, sba p=0.393, c-section p=0.361). This suggests that any bias in 
reporting as a result of faded memories is relatively small. This is perhaps not surprising given that 
birth events including place and type of birth are likely to be extremely memorable. A log-likelihood 
ratio nested test suggests that inclusion of higher order polynomial trends do not add significantly to 
the explanatory power of the model (߯ଶ ൌ  ? ?Ǥ ?ǡ ݌ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ሻǤ 
Discussion 
In the ten years prior to the introduction of the MIS there were only modest improvements in the 
utilisation of health services, mainly in the tarai ecological zone (figure 1).  The MIS and SDIP 
programmes were associated with an increase in facility delivery and birth with a skilled health worker. 
While the two-year effect of the MIS was large and statistically significant in tarai and hill areas, the 
association was negative in mountain areas. Following introduction of the SDIP, the initial negative 
effect in mountain areas was reversed and overall a positive cumulative impact is suggested in all 
zones. While the programmes benefit all areas, the effect appears to be strongest in the tarai. This 
finding is likely to be underpinned by the much better transport links, concentration of referral 
hospitals and better retention of skilled birth attendants than in mountain and hill areas (Upreti SR et 
al., 2014).  The most important policy in stimulating demand amongst the poor living in mountain 
areas are the supply-incentives introduced by the SDIP. In contrast, the MIS largely appear to benefit 
non-poor populations.  
The uneven implementation of the programme through, for example, inadequate publicising of the 
scheme and problems in ensuring cash was available, suggests the effect of the policy could be gradual 
and possibly non-linear.  The significance of the policy trend terms confirms the gradual impact. It is 
difficult to disentangle these effects from more complex long-term trends in outcomes. Tests of more 
complex non-linear time trends were not significant but we remain unsure whether the slow and 
sporadic pace of change is fully captured by the model parameters. 
The 2009 Aama programme roll-out appears to have no significant effect on outcomes. The financing 
policy in Nepal combined universal demand-side payments with targeted supply-side payments in 
poorer areas. The latter was later rolled out as the Aama programme which forms part of the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĨƌĞĞĐĂƌĞƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?dŚĞĂŵĂƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŝƐĂĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ
supply and demand-side interventions and so it is perhaps not surprising that no separate, significant 
effect of the programme could be isolated.  
The Aama programme introduced higher reimbursement for provision of caesarean section. There 
was concern that this would incentivise surgical delivery beyond what is medically necessary. The 
results suggest no substantial effect of the policies on surgical delivery. A small positive overall impact 
is recorded for mountain areas (p=0.1) but from a very low base. Even in Tarai, the rates are not high 
by international standards although continue to be monitored. Costing studies suggest that 
reimbursement rates are not substantially higher than the costs of these services (Suresh Tiwari et al., 
2015) 
Reliance on retrospective NDHS survey data has a number of limitations. Perhaps the main one is the 
extent to which causation can be concluded from the associations. The consistency of policy 
association to change in outcomes was tested by running a test for a structural break.  Breaks occurring 
before the policy suggests that changes associated with the policy are a coincidence. The test found a 
structural break for tarai areas early in 2006 (April) and November 2006 for hill areas. This appears to 
be consistent with policy changes which affected tarai areas most strongly after the MIS while in hill 
areas the effect was felt most strongly after SDIP began. In mountain areas, a break is not indicated 
until the end of 2007 reflecting the much weaker effects in these areas and the likelihood that the 
changes were contingent on gradual improvements on the supply side.   
Although the structural break tests do not reject the hypothesis of policy impact, we are still left with 
the difficulty of disentangling other concurrent policies from the programmes. Financing policies were 
a late addition to the National Reproductive Health Strategy in 1998 which emphasised improvements 
on the supply side through construction of birthing centres, training of skilled birth attendants and 
improved emergency care provision. Despite considerable policy effort, by 2005 the improvement in 
maternal service utilisation had been modest; a finding that substantially prompted the development 
of the MIS. It may of course be that the supply-side initiatives took time to have effect or that a 
combination of supply and demand side strategies were needed in order to impact on use of services; 
a finding supported in other reviews (Murray et al., 2014). Indeed we conjecture that the more modest 
overall improvement in mountain and hill areas was due to the lack of birthing services, trained health 
workers and life-saving surgical provision in these areas. The 2012 survey found that 50% of  district 
hospitals did not provide all CEONC signal functions while 11% of health posts and 20% of sub health 
posts with birthing facilities had expired oxytocin (Ministry of Health and Population, 2013).  It is also 
the case that, as suggested in the 2003 survey, although the payment in mountain areas is three times 
that in the tarai it only partly mitigates the financial burden on households and care remains 
prohibitively expensive for many (Borghi et al., 2006).  
The international literature on maternal health financing mechanisms suggest a generally positive 
effect on use of services while the impact on quality, equity and outcomes is more equivocal (Murray 
et al., 2014, Morgan et al., 2013). This study reinforces these findings. Overall, the policies had a 
positive impact on utilisation but with variation by geography and wealth group.  The Nepal 
mechanisms are a combination of targeted and universal. The consolidated Aama scheme is universal 
in focusing on all pregnant women yet differences in the scheme across areas of the country are 
allowed to reflect differences in utilisation barriers experienced. The positive effect on the overall and 
non-poor population of the policy package, particularly the MIS, in tarai and hill areas suggests that 
the demand-side incentives have enabled women to make use of existing services.  
The effect of the policies in mountain areas is complex. While the MIS on its own had no significant 
effect, the SDIP exhibited a strong positive effect. Although we model these two policies separately, 
it is likely that the combination of the two policies was important in encouraging an increase in 
utilisation (with an initial negative effect of the MIS more than countered by the positive SDIP effect) 
and the overall impact on the poor is substantial. We conjecture, that the MIS alone was not sufficient 
to permit increased service uptake because of continued lack of services in health facilities. This was 
recognised in the assessment of the safer motherhood programme which suggested that while 
investments are relatively straightforward, ensuring the services are available requires a recurrent 
funding commitment (Rath et al., 2007).  The SDIP provided a flow of funds into facilities to allow them 
deliver services. The non-poor also benefit from the policies but since the poor (bottom two quintiles 
based on national distribution) in mountain areas make up almost 60% of the population the benefits 
are reasonably pro-poor. More progress is still required since access by poor women to skilled birthing 
services in mountain areas still lag well behind access to services of those in other zones (table 2). 
The lack of programme effect for the poor in hill areas is notable. Services in hill and tarai areas are 
generally quite crowded (HMIS suggests that bed-occupancy is double that in mountain areas) which 
may mean that it is more difficult for patients to receive service without additional payment.  There is 
even some evidence that maternal patients displace other patients in the most crowded facilities 
(Adhikari et al., 2011). A rapid assessment of the programme  suggested that despite the free provision 
health facilities still charge some patients for services (Mehata et al., 2012). Getting money for 
treatment is still mentioned by more than half of women as an impediment to obtaining maternal 
services (Ministry of Health and Population et al., 2012). Systems for monitoring quality remain weak 
with the result and long distances mean that women in many areas are unable to choose alternative 
providers.  
Unlike mechanisms in some other countries (Murray et al., 2014), the Aama programme is well 
integrated into the public health system which provides a good basis for expanding coverage as part 
of a commitment to universal health coverage. If service uptake improvements are to be maintained 
greater attention is required on the use of services in the poorest and most inaccessible areas, a 
direction that is currently being explored by policy makers. It is expected that governmeŶƚŽĨEĞƉĂů ?Ɛ
recent decision to upgrade all sub-health posts will contribute to offering delivery services closer to 
the poor and hard to reach areas. The trends also raise questions about the focus of demand-side 
interventions which have largely benefited the non-poor. Abolishing these payments because they 
benefit the non-poor runs the risk of making access to the poor even more unaffordable. Instead there 
seems to be a growing case to concentrate these incentives on the poor in poor areas in order to 
deliver on the promise of universal coverage.  
 
  
  
  
 
 
. 
References 
ADHIKARI, S., PRASAI, D. & SHARMA, S. 2011. A review of demand-side financing schemes in the 
health sector of Nepal. Kathmandu: Nepal health Sector Support Programme. 
BHUSAL, C. L., SINGH, S. P., BC, R. K., DHIMAL, M., JHA, B. K., ACHARYA, L., THAPA, P. & MAGAR, A. 
2011. Effectiveness and efficiency of Aama Surakshya Karyakram in terms of barriers in 
accessing maternal health services in Nepal. J Nepal Health Res Counc, 9, 129-37. 
BORGHI, J., ENSOR, T., NEUPANE, B. D. & TIWARI, S. 2006. Financial implications of skilled 
attendance at delivery in Nepal. Tropical Medicine & International Health, 11, 228-237. 
ENSOR, T., CLAPHAM, S. & PRASAI, D. P. 2008. What drives health policy formulation: Insights from 
the Nepal maternity incentive scheme? Health Policy. 
ENSOR, T. & WITTER, S. 2008. Proposed Revisions to The SDIP  W Strengthening a Major National 
Initiative for Safe Motherhood In Nepal. London: Options. 
FAMILY HEALTH DIVISION 2005. Maternity Incentive Scheme Policy Guideline. Kathmandu, Nepal: 
Department of Health Services, Ministry of Health and Population. 
FAMILY HEALTH DIVISION 2007. Safe Delivery Incentive Programme Policy Guideline. Kathmandu: 
Department of Health Services, Ministry of Health and Population. 
FAMILY HEALTH DIVISION 2009. Aama Surakshya Programme Policy Guideline. Kathmandu: 
Department of Health Services, Ministry of Health and Population. 
MEHATA, S., BARAL, S. C., CHAND, P. B., SINGH, D. R., POUDEL, P. & BARNETT S. 2012. Service 
Tracking Survey 2012. Kathmandu, Nepal  MoHP. 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND POPULATION 2004. Annual Report Department of Health Services 
2059/60 (2003/04). Kathmandu: Ministry of Health and Population. 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND POPULATION 2013. Nepal Household Survey 2012. Kathmandu, Nepal: 
Ministry of Health and Population, Government of Nepal. 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND POPULATION, NEW ERA & MACRO INTERNATIONAL INC. 2012. Nepal 
Demographic and Health Survey 2011. Kathmandu, Nepal: Ministry of Health and 
Population, New ERA, and Macro International Inc. 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND POPULATION NEPAL, PARTNERSHIP FOR MATERNAL, N. C. H., WHO & 
Z^Z, ? ?t ? ? ? ?& ?, ?W ? ?^ ? ? ? ? ? ?^ƵĐĐĞƐƐĨĂĐƚŽƌƐĨŽƌǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂŶĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚ P
Nepal. Geneva: World Health Organisation. 
MORGAN, L., STANTON, M. E., HIGGS, E. S., BALSTER, R. L., BELLOWS, B. W., BRANDES, N., 
COMFORT, A. B., EICHLER, R., GLASSMAN, A., HATT, L. E., CONLON, C. M. & KOBLINSKY, M. 
2013. Financial incentives and maternal health: where do we go from here? J Health Popul 
Nutr, 31, 8-22. 
MURRAY, S. F., HUNTER, B. M., BISHT, R., ENSOR, T. & BICK, D. 2014. Effects of demand-side 
financing on utilisation, experiences and outcomes of maternity care in low- and middle-
income countries: a systematic review. BMC Pregnancy Childbirth, 14, 30. 
POWELL-JACKSON, T. & HANSON, K. 2012. Financial incentives for maternal health: Impact of a 
national programme in Nepal. Journal of Health Economics, 31, 271-84. 
POWELL-JACKSON, T., MORRISON, J., TIWARI, S., NEUPANE, B. D. & COSTELLO, A. M. 2009. The 
experiences of districts in implementing a national incentive programme to promote safe 
delivery in Nepal. BMC Health Serv Res, 9. 
POWELL-JACKSON, T., TIWARI, S., NEUPANE, B. D. & SINGH, M. 2010. An early evaluation of the 
Aama "Free Delivery Care" Programme. Nepal Safer Motherhood Programme. 
RATH, A. D., BASNETT, I., COLE, M., SUBEDI, H. N., THOMAS, D. & MURRAY, S. F. 2007. Improving 
emergency obstetric care in a context of very high maternal mortality: the Nepal Safer 
Motherhood Project 1997-2004. Reprod Health Matters, 15, 72-80. 
SUBEDI, S., KAPHLE, H. P., ACHARYA, S., GUPTA, N. & JAIN, V. 2015. Maternal incentive scheme in 
Nepal  W status of knowledge and financial benefits received by mothers on ANC incentive 
and safe delivery incentive program. Indian Journal of Cmmunity Health, 26, 273-277. 
SURESH TIWARI, HEMA BHATT, TIM ENSOR, BAL KRISHNA SUVEDI, TOMAS LIEVENS, CHRIS JAMES & 
SHARAD KUMAR SHARMA 2015. Unit cost analysis of the health facility reimbursement 
made under the Aama Programme. . Kathmandu: Ministry of Health and Population/Family 
Health Division and Nepal Health Sector Support Programme. 
TIM POWELL-JACKSON & REBECCA WOLFE 2008. Encouraging women to use professional care at 
childbirth. Does Nepal's Safe Delivery Incentive Programme work? . Institute of Child Health, 
London: Towards  4+5  Research Programme Consortium. 
UPRETI SR, BARAL S, LAMICHHANE P, KHANAL MN, TIWARI S, TANDAN M, H, E., LEVINS & RAPIS, T. 
2014. Assessment of the Demand Side Financing Scheme: Aama and 4 ANC programmes 
(The seventh Rapid Assessment). Kathmandu, Nepal: Ministry of Heath and Population; 
Nepal Health Sector Support Programme and Health Research and Social Development 
Forum. 
WITTER, S., FRETHEIM, A., KESSY, F. L. & LINDAHL, A. K. 2012. Paying for performance to improve the 
delivery of health interventions in low- and middle-income countries. Cochrane Database 
Syst Rev, 2, CD007899. 
WITTER, S., KHADKA, S., NATH, H. & TIWARI, S. 2011. The national free delivery policy in Nepal: early 
evidence of its effects on health facilities. Health Policy Plan, 26 Suppl 2, ii84-91. 
 
  
 Table 1: evolution of main policy changes (policy variables used in multivariate analysis in brackets) 
 
Pre-MIS MIS (July 2005) SDIP (July 2006) Aama (Jan 2009) 
Tarai 
Reference, 
Tm 
NPR 500 transport 
(intercept ܶଵ , slope ௠ܶଵ    NPR 500 transport ( ܶଵ , ௠ܶଵ   ) NPR  500 transport plus free delivery 
( ܶଵ ൅ ܶଷ , ௠ܶଵ ൅ ௠ܶଷ   ) 
Hill (high 
HDI) 
H, Hm 
NPR 1,000 transport 
(intercept ܪଵ , slope ܪ௠ଵ    NPR 1,000 transport ( ܪଵ , ܪ௠ଵ   ) 
NPR 1,000 transport plus 
free delivery 
( ܪଵ ൅ ܪଷ , ܪ௠ଵ ൅ ܪ௠ଷ   ) 
Hill (low 
HDI) 
NPR 1,000 transport plus  
free delivery 
(ܪଵ ൅ ܪଶ , ܪ௠ଵ ൅ ܪ௠ଶ   ) NPR 1,000 transport plus free delivery (ܪଵ ൅ ܪଶ , ܪ௠ଵ ൅ ܪ௠ଶ   ) 
Mountain 
M, Mm 
NPR transport 1,500 
(intercept ܯଵ , slope ܯ௠ଵ    NPR 1,500 transport plus free delivery (ܯଵ ൅ ܯଶ , ܯ௠ଵ ൅ ܯ௠ଶ   ) NPR 1,500 transport plus free delivery (ܯଵ ൅  ܯଶ , ܯ௠ଵ ൅ ܯ௠ଶ  ) 
 
 
  
Table 2: Outcome indicators over the main policy periods (proportion of total births) 
    Full sample   Bottom two quintiles 
    
Pre-
MIS 
MIS 
(July 
2005) 
SDIP 
(July 
2006) 
Aama 
(Jan 
2009) 
  
Pre-MIS 
MIS 
(July 
2005) 
SDIP 
(July 
2006) 
Aama 
(Jan 
2009) 
Tarai Facility delivery 15.6% 26.6% 41.2% 56.1%   5.9% 11.3% 12.5% 27.5% 
  With skilled provider 17.2% 27.8% 43.3% 56.1%   6.8% 10.5% 12.5% 25.5% 
  Caesarean section 1.0% 1.8% 2.3% 4.5%   0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hill (high 
HDI) Facility delivery 18.3% 25.2% 33.8% 46.1%   5.8% 2.6% 12.6% 14.3% 
  With skilled provider 20.1% 26.3% 33.3% 43.1%   7.0% 3.4% 10.6% 11.8% 
  Caesarean section 1.7% 2.2% 3.0% 3.5%   0.7% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 
Hill (low HDI) Facility delivery 5.0% 12.6% 20.7% 28.2%   2.9% 4.3% 11.6% 13.2% 
  With skilled provider 5.6% 13.5% 21.3% 27.0%   3.5% 5.2% 11.5% 12.4% 
  Caesarean section 0.4% 0.0% 0.3% 0.8%   0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Mountain Facility delivery 5.8% 12.7% 13.7% 29.6%   3.5% 7.8% 5.3% 16.0% 
  With skilled provider 6.5% 15.3% 15.0% 27.6%   4.1% 8.5% 5.7% 13.8% 
  Caesarean section 0.3% 0.0% 0.4% 1.0%   0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 
 
  
Table 3: Pooled interrupted time series analysis of NDHS 
  
Facility 
delivery     
Delivery 
with 
skilled 
worker 
    
  
C-
section 
  
  Coef. SE   Coef. SE   Coef. SE   
Policy variables                   
Hill (dummy) - 0.157   0.241  
  
- 0.287    0.231  
  
   1.165         0.53  
 **  
Mountain (dummy) - 1.102   0.417  *** - 1.100    0.385  ***    1.063         0.97     
Tarai (time-trend)   0.005   0.002  **   0.000    0.002       0.013         0.01   **  
Hill (time-trend)   0.003   0.003  
  
  0.003    0.003  
  
-  0.005         0.01  
   
Mountain (time-trend)   0.009   0.007  
  
  0.006    0.007  
  
-  0.022         0.02  
   
MIS-dummy (Tarai)   0.222   0.189  
  
  0.326    0.191  * -  0.572         0.49     
MIS-dummy (hill) - 0.092   0.241  
  
- 0.040    0.221  
  
   0.051         0.54  
   
MIS-dummy (mountain)   1.329   0.591  **   1.386    0.584  ** -10.755     873.28     
MIS-slope (Tarai)   0.017   0.007  **   0.022    0.007  *** -  0.007         0.02     
MIS-slope (hill)   0.034   0.010  ***   0.021    0.009  **    0.012         0.02     
MIS-slope (mountain) - 0.165   0.079  ** - 0.146    0.079  *    0.052     110.29     
SDIP-dummy (hill)   0.435   0.425  
  
  0.588    0.418  
  
-  1.684         1.59  
   
SDIP-dummy (mountain)   0.730   0.549  
  
  0.623    0.543  
  
   9.447     685.99  
   
SDIP-slope (hill) - 0.018   0.014  
  
- 0.014    0.013  
  
   0.023         0.05  
   
SDIP-slope (mountain)   0.184   0.078  **   0.158    0.078  **    0.033     110.29     
Aama-dummy (Tarai)   0.211   0.274  
  
  0.150    0.264  
  
   0.992         0.51  
 *  
Aama-dummy (mountain) - 0.299   0.345  
  
- 0.284    0.339  
  
   0.378         0.65  
   
Aama-slope (Tarai)   0.004   0.015  
  
- 0.005    0.017  
  
-  0.030         0.03  
   
Aama-slope (mountain) - 0.011   0.020  
  
  0.002    0.019  
  
-  0.024         0.04  
   
Observations  (N)  14,214      14,453      14,007     
                    
Marginal effects (after 24 months, percentage point changes) 
MIS                   
Tarai      7.70      0.02  ***   10.20      0.02  *** -    0.50         0.00   **  
Hill      7.80      0.02  ***      5.20      0.02  ***       0.20         0.00     
Mountain -   6.30      0.02  *** -   7.81      0.03  *** -    0.09         0.00     
SDIP 
    
  
    
  
    
   
Hill (low hdi areas)      0.02      0.03  
  
     2.20      0.04  
  
-    0.34         0.00  
   
Mountain   75.50      0.16  ***   70.00      0.22  ***    94.99       97.58     
Aama 
    
  
    
  
    
   
Tarai      3.00      0.04  
  
     0.20      0.04  
  
      0.50         0.02  
   
Hill -   3.60      0.04  
  
-   2.40      0.05  
  
-    0.10         0.00  
   
Cumulative effect     
  
    
  
    
   
Tarai   25.50      0.04  ***   28.10      0.04  *** -    0.84         0.01     
Hill   12.80      0.07  *   12.30      0.07  *       0.10         0.01     
Mountain   13.30      0.06  **   10.00      0.05  **       1.97         0.01   *  
Notes:  
x Mixed effects models: ߯ଶ likelihood ratio test supported use of household, time period and district level 
effects. 
x Statistically significant at: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level 
x ŽǀĂƌŝĂƚĞƐ P ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǁŽŵĂŶ ? ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ůŽĐĂƚŝŶ  ?ƌƵƌĂů-urban), wealth, religion, birth 
parity. 
 
  
Table 4: Marginal effects (percentage point changes) of policies on facility delivery for poor and non-
poor (after 24 months) 
  Poor Non-Poor 
  Coef. SE   Coef. SE   
MIS 
            
Tarai 
       1.60       0.026         11.20        0.027  *** 
Hill 
       3.10       0.015  **      13.10        0.039  *** 
Mountain 
-      4.43       0.011  *** -    22.50        0.071  *** 
SDIP 
            
Hill (low hdi areas) 
-      0.50       0.018    -      9.90        0.056  * 
Mountain 
     89.00       0.128  ***      75.10        0.099  *** 
Aama 
          -              
Tarai 
       6.00       0.139           3.00        0.071    
Hill 
-      4.40       0.014  *** -      0.50        0.095    
Cumulative effect 
            
Tarai 
     14.80       0.073  **      30.10        0.049  *** 
Hill 
-      3.10       0.019  *      29.80        0.112  *** 
Mountain 
       8.10       0.045  *      17.60        0.184    
x Poor defined as bottom two and non-poor top two wealth quintiles. 
x Statistically significant at: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level 
x Covariates:  as for table 2 
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